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Foreword
The debate over whether ‘prison works’ seems interminable. The Howard League 
for Penal Reform has well established views on this topic, but political realities make 
revisiting this question, and perhaps deconstructing assumptions on both sides of 
the argument, both timely and valuable.
The prison population in England and Wales has more than doubled since the mid 
1990s. While the latest projections over the coming six years suggest that this 
growth may be slowing, there is no suggestion that the number of men, women 
and children incarcerated on any one day will drop below 80,000. Statisticians’ 
most optimistic assessment suggests numbers could at most drop to the level first 
reached in 2007 – an increase of 86 per cent compared to the prison population 
in 1991.  
At the same time, the realities of running a justice system during an age of austerity 
are becoming ever clearer. The Ministry of Justice must achieve £2bn annual 
savings by March 2015 and the failure to deliver sentencing reforms originally 
proposed by Kenneth Clarke has meant that around £130m of potential savings 
have been lost. A recent report by the National Audit Office found that the agency 
in charge of prisons and probation is now projected to overspend by £32m in  
2012-13 alone.
If that is the difficult context for policymakers, then this paper, written by three leading 
criminologists on behalf of the Howard League, provides a framework for new thinking 
that might provide an escape from the current prisons crisis. The Ministry of Justice 
does not have the funds to build its way out of the overcrowding in the system, and 
there is little scope for further efficiency savings without endangering key principles 
of security and giving up on any pretence of a ‘rehabilitation revolution’. As the 
Chief Inspector of Prisons wrote in his most recent annual report, “if a rehabilitation 
revolution is to be delivered, there is a clear choice for politicians and policy makers – 
reduce prison populations or increase prison budgets.”
This paper begins by examining the perennial arguments around the efficacy of 
community sentencing over short spells in custody. An even-handed analysis 
concedes that the picture is not a simple one, and that indeed it is the very 
complexity of the problem that necessitates a value-based approach to penal policy. 
It suggests that any cost-benefit analysis must take into account the long term 
impact of dramatic increases in imprisonment, which bring with them increases in 
a number of social problems that themselves sow the seeds for future crime: be it 
family breakdown, drug and alcohol addiction or poor physical and mental health. 
In the United States for example, this has seen the creation of a system “that feeds 
upon itself” and which has left many individual states near bankruptcy.
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4The authors conclude by asking for a new emphasis on not simply the prevention 
of reoffending through deterrence or incapacitation, but on constructing a penal 
system which seeks to encourage compliance with the law. This idea that people 
respond best when buying into behaviour such as abiding by the law, rather than 
being constantly compelled or cajoled into doing so, has powerful implications 
for future policymaking. It suggests, for example, that a narrow focus on paying 
providers by their results using the limited picture of reconviction rates may not 
be the best way to structure prisons and probation. It also suggests that an 
overweening focus on containing risk, essentially basing a system on a fear of 
failure, precludes redemptive narratives that promise more success in changing lives 
and reducing crime. Is the penal system to be based on unaffordable expansion 
and a fear of failure, or shall it live within its means and celebrate success? This is a 
question that must be answered sooner rather than later. 
Frances Crook
Chief Executive, The Howard League for Penal Reform
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Introduction
This paper revisits the much argued question about the relative merits of prison 
and community sentences. We decided to write it out of a sense that debate has 
become trapped in an unproductive Punch and Judy fight about which of the 
two sentences ‘works’ better. To anticipate our conclusions, assessed in narrow 
instrumental terms the arguments are more finely balanced than either side usually 
recognise. However, pro- and anti-prison camps are really arguing – in an oblique 
sort of way – about broader values, and if this paper helps to promote a more 
mature debate about penal policy that recognises this, we shall have succeeded in 
our task.
To understand the dynamics of the current penal debate, one has to look back 
to the 1970s, when ‘progressive’ thinking tended to be sceptical about what 
‘treatment’, whether in criminal justice or social work or psychiatry, could actually 
achieve. At that time, the case for minimising the use of imprisonment relied on 
the argument that neither custodial nor community sentences ‘worked’ very well in 
reducing reoffending, so the cheaper option was the better one. This perspective 
became quite institutionalised in the probation service, which at the time used 
statistical assessment techniques (or ‘risk of custody scales’) to identify which 
of their ‘clients’ were most likely to get prison sentences, enabling them to offer 
sentencers a tailor-made alternative for this group. Using tools to assess the risk of 
reoffending was a much later development.
Towards the end of the 1980s, however, there emerged a greater sense of optimism 
that well designed community-based programmes could actually do more good 
than harm, and (more importantly) more good than prison. Much of the evidence 
for this came from North American evaluations (or meta-analyses of numerous 
evaluations), especially of cognitive behavioural programmes; the research 
suggested that properly designed and implemented programmes could reduce 
re-offending, as measured by reconviction rates. At the same time as encouraging 
evidence about programmes was emerging, the Conservative administration of 
the day developed policies to promote ‘punishment in the community’ and to get 
the probation service to ‘move centre stage’. This policy change was premised, 
it should be said, not so much on the optimistic new research findings but more 
on concern about rising prison costs and on a related desire to recast community 
sentences as ‘proper’ and proportionate punishments in their own rights, rather 
than as (rehabilitative) alternatives to punishment. 
This ‘decarceral’ policy and the 1991 Criminal Justice Act which put it into 
effect, were badly received. Crime at the time was still rising rapidly and the 
opposition party (as ‘New’ Labour) was beginning to offer a credible challenge to 
6the Conservatives as the party that would be tough on crime. The Conservative 
administration did not abandon its plans for community sentences, but moved them 
swiftly away from centre stage, and rapidly amended key parts of the 1991 Act. 
In parallel, it adopted a much tougher line on penal policy, best exemplified by the 
claim in 1993 of Home Secretary Michael Howard that “prison works”. This shift in 
the climate of penal debate prompted a substantial toughening up of sentencing 
– even if there was no actual legislative change (Hough and Jacobson, 2003). The 
threshold for passing a prison sentence was lowered, and sentence length grew. 
Accordingly the number of prisoners started to rise; in 1991 there were 43,000 
prisoners, by 2007 there were 80,000.   
This shift of emphasis prompted renewed interest in questions of the ‘incapacitative’ 
effects of imprisonment. If prison works, is this through deterrence, or simply by 
keeping people who offend locked up and out of circulation? How much crime is 
actually prevented by keeping people in prison (through ‘incapacitation’)?  How big 
a deterrent effect does prison have in stopping people from reoffending in future 
(through ‘individual deterrence’)? And how big an effect does prison have on the 
rest of the population (through ‘general deterrence’)? For the most part, these 
questions had been ignored by advocates of community punishment in the 1980s, 
at a time when there was still a political consensus that imprisonment should be 
used as sparingly as possible. It was at this point that the Home Office started once 
again to pay real attention to reconviction studies, and to try to estimate the size of 
incapacitation effects.
Since the mid 1990s the arguments between the two camps have not progressed 
very far. Advocates of alternatives to custody argued then and still argue, that these 
are not only cheaper but more effective in terms of reducing reoffending. They 
variously argue that:
(a) The general deterrent effects of tough sentencing are unproven
(b) The right sort of community sentences achieve lower reconviction  
  rates than imprisonment
(c) They do so at a much lower cost than imprisonment
(d) They are less damaging than custodial sentences for individuals  
  and communities.
Those who favour tougher punishment have counter-argued that:
(a) differences in reconviction rates are small or non-existent
(b) but in any case the way that reductions in offending are   
  measured – using reconviction rates –  fails to take account   
  of incapacitation effects 
(c) prison is cost-effective when properly and fully costed.
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Who is right?
Perhaps the most hotly contested of these arguments is the one about incapacitation 
effects – the impact of keeping people who have offended out of circulation. But first, 
let us consider what is known about general deterrence, and about the rehabilitative 
and deterrent impacts of sentences on people who receive them.
General deterrence
That people should still argue about general deterrence in criminal justice probably 
reflects two things: first, most of the population tend to respond well to deterrent 
threat for less serious regulations, such as traffic offences, and find it inconceivable 
that others may react differently; and secondly, most of us refrain from committing 
crimes of any severity for reasons quite unconnected with deterrence. Most of us take 
an instrumental approach to many of life’s decisions, weighing up costs and benefits; 
and yet normative factors – or a sense of right and wrong – also guide much of our 
behaviour. These two realities provide room for heated argument about deterrence.
There is evidence that people’s behaviour can be readily shaped through various 
regulatory mechanisms, provided that these are seen to carry at least a degree 
of legitimacy, and the threat of imposing a penalty is regarded as plausible. For 
example, compliance with the London congestion zone regulation is very high.Yet, 
a small proportion of the population is remarkably unresponsive to deterrent threat, 
or actually responds to deterrence with defiance. The criminological consensus 
is that there are general deterrent effects for offences the commission of which 
typically involves a significant degree of rational decision-making, and the key factor 
determining the magnitude of the effect is the likelihood of punishment, rather than 
the severity of punishment. A small but certain penalty will be much more effective 
than a large but uncertain one. Crucially, individuals vary in their responsiveness to 
deterrent threats, and some are sufficiently stubborn – or sufficiently dispossessed 
– to be inured to deterrent threat. People with little or no stake in conformity – with 
nothing much to lose – are hard to deter; as are people who can’t or won’t weigh 
up the medium and long term consequences of their actions before acting.
The impact of punishment on the punished: differences in reconviction rates
Conventionally, criminologists have distinguished between individual (or special) 
deterrence, where people who have broken the law learn from being punished that 
further offending is no longer in their interests, and rehabilitative treatment, where the 
impulse to offend is removed, or some other ‘cause’ of offending is tackled. In reality, 
a rehabilitative penalty can have deterrent effects (by helping people to think more 
consequentially), and deterrent sentences can rehabilitate (by encouraging people to 
engage with interventions). Both deterrence and rehabilitation are usually measured 
by reconviction rates – that is, whether once sentenced, the individual is caught again 
and brought before the courts for punishment.  
8Different categories of penalty – fines, community sentences, imprisonment – have 
widely differing reconviction rates. However, this is principally because judges and 
magistrates take into account factors such as the seriousness of the offence and 
the criminal history of the person being sentenced; these factors are themselves 
correlated with reconviction. Thus someone who steals something of low value 
from a shop for the first time has a low risk of reoffending, and to reflect the low 
gravity and low risk, he or she will typically be fined. Someone with thirty previous 
convictions who burgles a home is very likely to reoffend, and will typically go to 
prison. As a result of this, reconviction rates for those sent to prison are on average 
much higher than those who are fined – but that is unsurprising. Simple comparisons 
of reconviction rates for different types of penalty therefore tell us very little.
However, it is possible to use a range of statistical techniques to create groups that 
are much more comparable in terms of their demographic characteristics and their 
criminal histories. When this is done, the different ‘outcomes’ of different types of 
penalty – and of different lengths of prison sentence – become much smaller. Where 
differences remain – and they sometimes do – it is difficult to assess whether these 
are real, or if they simply reflect inadequate statistical matching. Thus the most recent 
analysis conducted by the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) suggests that for young people, 
low level community service orders have a lower reconviction rate than high level 
ones, which in turn have a slightly lower reconviction rate than a custodial sentence 
(Ministry of Justice, 2012). For adults, community orders have lower reconviction rates 
than short prison sentences, which in turn have higher reconviction rates than longer 
sentences (Ministry of Justice, 2011). One reading of these findings is that short prison 
sentences are less effective than either community orders or longer spells in custody. 
Another reading is that the available data does not allow sufficiently precise matching 
of people who offend to make reliable comparisons. In the words of the MoJ 2012 
Compendium, 
The true impact of offender management programmes and probation 
supervision cannot be reliably established using current Ministry of Justice 
administrative data.
(Ministry of Justice, 2012: 4) 
This is not to say that sentences have no effect. On the contrary, all types of penalty 
are likely to have a mix of good and bad effects. Different people react in different 
ways to different sorts of penalty. For some people, the “clang of the prison door” 
has precisely the impact that advocates of short prison sentences assume; for 
others the experience may accelerate them down a criminal pathway. Similarly, 
probation supervision may be a positive, even life-changing, experience for some, 
but for others it can be demeaning and patronising.
Part of the problem is that when we compare the outcomes of different sentences, 
we treat those sentences as if they were concrete ‘things’; yet much empirical 
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sociology of punishment makes it very clear that the same formal sentences may 
make for very different informal experiences of punishment, which have very different 
meanings and effects. To put it bluntly, when we ask the question ‘does it work?’, we 
assume that we know clearly what ‘it’ is. Each person’s lived reality of punishment is 
very different; what imprisonment or probation is depends very much on those who 
deliver it and on those subjected to it.
This makes it hard to say definitively what ‘works’ and what doesn’t. But, at the 
risk of over-generalising, some sentences work with rather few people (one of 
the best – and counterintuitive – examples being ‘Scared Straight’ programmes 
where young lawbreakers are lectured about the pointlessness of a life of crime 
by people who have themselves been through the punishment mill). As mentioned 
above, easily enforceable fines for regulatory offences tend to work well for most 
people. In between these two extremes, for crimes of middling to high severity most 
sentences work well with some people and not with others. We would agree with 
Pease (2010:7) that when it comes to broad categories of penalty, such as fine vs. 
community penalty, or community vs. prison:
Generally, one can predict probability of reconviction at the time of 
sentence on the basis of criminal history. There is no evidence that 
choice of sentence adds predictive power. The reconviction figures for 
both community sentences and custody are almost exactly as would be 
predicted beforehand.
(Pease, 2010: 7)
To stress the point again, this is not to say that nothing works; some things, and 
some people, are particularly good at helping those with a history of offending 
to  stop  –  but it is too crude and simplistic to argue that sentences delivered by 
probation staff are in aggregate more effective at stopping reoffending than prison 
sentences or vice-versa. Advocates of community sentences and those who are 
more sceptical have common ground in their misguided attempts to over-generalise 
about what works, although there has been a tendency for the former to oversell the 
benefits of community sentences, and for the latter to ignore the counterproductive 
consequences of imprisonment, both on people who offend and on others whose 
lives are affected.
Keeping people who offend out of circulation: incapacitation
There is much less agreement about the amount of crime that can be prevented 
simply by keeping people who offend locked up in prison, out of circulation. No-
one can argue with the proposition that so long as someone is in prison, it is 
impossible for them to commit crimes against anyone but staff and fellow inmates. 
So if everyone convicted of burglary were given, say, a 25 year sentence, there 
would almost certainly be a significant fall in numbers of burglaries (as well as an 
unsustainable hike in prison budgets and widespread public unease). Most people 
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would also agree that the incapacitative effect of very short sentences is marginal. 
The issue is thus about the costs or benefits of incapacitation strategies in the 
middle range.
Calculating numbers of crimes prevented by imprisoning a group convicted of 
crimes for a given length of time turns out to be remarkably complex. The simplest 
approach is to calculate the group’s offending rate for periods when at liberty, and 
to calculate from this the number of prevented offences. So, let us take a group of 
100 convicted burglars, whose conviction rate is two offences per person per year. 
Let us assume that they commit four crimes for every one that is detected. The 
group thus commits over a 12 month period 1,000 crimes – which for the sake of 
argument are split four ways between offences of theft/handling, burglary, drugs 
offences and violence. It is tempting to think that if they were each imprisoned for 
a year, 1,000 crimes would be prevented, at a cost of £4,000,000, or £4,000 per 
crime – but we shall return to issues of cost below.
However, this calculation is actually misleading, for several quite complicated 
reasons. First, most people who offend persistently have criminal careers that 
start in their teens, peak in their mid twenties and then fall away. If this group is 
imprisoned for a long period towards the end of their criminal career, when they 
are in any case approaching ‘retirement’, there are much smaller returns. If they 
are imprisoned at the peak of their career, we simply do not know whether the 
prevented offences are simply deferred or actually prevented. In other words, one 
possibility is that the individual’s career after release will continue on its previous 
trajectory, and thus genuinely prevent crimes; but equally it might be extended, in 
which case there are no preventive gains.
Secondly, there are substitution effects. To pursue the career metaphor, imprisoning 
one person sometimes create ‘job vacancies’ that are filled by other people. The 
most obvious example is in illicit drug markets, where the imprisonment of a low- or 
middle-level drug dealer is, in effect, a job opportunity or a promotion opportunity 
for someone else. But even in less structured group-offending, similar substitution 
may also occur: much offending is done in groups or networks, and we simply do 
not know what the impact is of removing a single member of the group. Pease’s 
(2010) estimate of the number of crimes prevented by extending short-sentence 
prisoners’ sentences by one month assumed that each and every crime committed 
by short sentence prisoners in the first month of their release would be prevented. It 
takes no account of deferred offending, or of substitution effects.1 
Thirdly, there is a real risk of amplification of offending. Prison can ‘train’ people for a 
criminal career, and simultaneously disqualify them from entry into the conventional 
job market. In part this is the well-known argument that prison can serve as a 
1 However, in Pease’s methodology, there is no case for proposing amplification effects, as these are probably 
no greater for a seven month sentence than for a six month one.
Intelligent Justice: Balancing the effects of community sentences and custody
11
‘school for criminals’, allowing people in prison to diversify their skills on the one 
hand, and on the other be immersed in a world where persistent offending is 
regarded as the norm. But imprisonment also blocks opportunities for moves into 
legitimate work; and by its nature, it is a form of dispossession that eventually gives 
people the freedom of those who have nothing more to lose –  or the ‘freedom of 
the dispossessed’. Recent research (Joliffe and Hedderman, 2012) lends support to 
the thesis that prison sentences can lead to more offending on release - or serve as 
schools for criminals. 
Fourthly, there are problems of diminishing returns. Our original estimate was of the 
total number of crimes prevented, rather than the gains at the margin in increasing 
imprisonment rates from the current levels – which is the real question for which 
policy needs answers. On the one hand, people who offend at a high rate would 
already spend quite a proportion of their life in prison, and the change in sentencing 
policy for burglary would not actually take them off the streets for a much larger 
proportion of their lives. On the other hand, if imprisonment criteria were widened 
to include people who offend at a low rate – and who are currently less at risk of 
imprisonment – the preventative impact would be less, because there would be 
fewer preventable crimes.
Finally, there is an open question about the incapacitative effects of some 
community sentences, which also need to be added into the equation. Although in 
a less complete way than imprisonment, some intensive community sentences do 
actually keep people who offend off the streets. The clearest example is electronic 
monitoring, but any order that requires people to spend a large amount of time out 
of circulation will have preventive benefits derived from incapacitation.
These points are intended simply to illustrate the complexity of calculating 
incapacitation. We are not arguing that the effects are non-existent, just that they 
are much more complicated to calculate than some have suggested. Figures 1 
to 3 are an attempt to illustrate graphically how some of these ‘perverse effects’ 
would work to reduce incapacitation effects. Figure 1 takes a hypothetical group 
of 100 people who offend persistently, and charts the number of offences they 
commit per year over the life of their criminal careers. At their peak in their mid-
twenties the group is committing 1,000 offences per year. The dotted bars in the 
figure show the incapacitative effects of the group serving two years in prison in 
their mid-twenties – assuming that there is no deferral of offending, no substitution 
and no amplification. It implies that around 2,000 offences would be prevented. 
However, Figure 2 shows patterns of offending if the offences prevented during 
imprisonment were actually deferred, and committed subsequently. Figure 3 
shows the combined effects of substitution and amplification – assuming on the 
one hand that imprisonment creates ‘job opportunities’ for others, and at the 
same time uplifts offending by serving as ‘school for criminals’.
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Figure 2:  Offences per year for a group of 100 persistent offenders, with 100% 
incapacitation but deferred offending following two years’ imprisonment at age of 25
Figure 1:  Offences per year for a group of 100 persistent offenders, showing 100% 
incapacitation effects of two years’ imprisonment at the age of 25
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Figure 3:  Offences per year for a group of 100 persistent offenders, with 50% 
incapacitation effects from two years’ imprisonment at age of 25 offset by substitution 
(with no deferred offending), and with 15% amplification of offending thereafter
So far, we have discussed ‘bottom up’ ways of calculating incapacitation which 
rely on estimates of crimes that would have occurred had it not been for the act 
of imprisonment. There are, however, alternative ‘top down’ ways of estimating 
incapacitation effects which observe variations in the use of imprisonment over 
place or time, and examine what relationships there are, if any, with crime rates – 
and infer incapacitation effects from these. These methods effectively side-step 
issues of deferred offending, substitution, amplification and so on. However, they 
are reliable only insofar as the econometric models on which they are based include 
all the relevant variables, and also specify the right forms of relationship between all 
relevant variables.2 
The Home Office updated some statistical modelling of incapacitation effects as part of its 
2001 (Halliday) review of sentencing. This estimated that around a 15 per cent rise in the 
prison population would yield a 1per cent reduction in recorded crime. A more focussed 
incapacitation strategy targeted at those who offend persistently might require a 7 per cent 
increase to achieve the same reduction (Home Office, 2001). The implication of this is that 
around seven percentage points of the fall in crime since 1995 can be attributed to the 
doubling of the prison population over this time. (In explaining the drop in crime, cross-
national explanations are needed, as most industrialised countries have seen crime falling. 
Improved design and security is likely to have been a significant factor.) 
2  With analysis of time-series data, the time-lags that are specified between variables such as imprisonment 
rates and crime rates are critical – and different assumptions about lag effects often determine whether an 
effect exists or not. 
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Cost-benefit analysis
What we have suggested so far is (a) that the deterrent or rehabilitative effects 
of community sentences and imprisonment are quite similar, measured through 
reconviction, and (b) that the preventive benefits of keeping people who offend out 
of circulation are easy to overestimate. This might suggest that the arguments are 
best resolved by cost-benefit analysis. However, as we argue below, we think that 
penal policy needs first and foremost to be value-based; although the accountant’s 
perspective remains a factor. The closer that the crime-preventive returns of any two 
penal policies are, the more scope there is to accommodate hard-to-cost benefits 
associated with values (since there is little else to choose between them).
There has been some argument about the costs of imprisonment, some arguing 
that a prison place costs under £30,000 per place,3 and others putting it at around 
£40,000. This is a simple matter to resolve. The lower figure (£28,728 per place in 
2010/11 in England and Wales) reflects running costs only, and the higher figure 
(£39,573) is a full cost, including capital costs. There may be a case for using the 
lower figure for very short-run policy changes, but in assessing any long-run policy 
changes there is no good reason to ignore capital costs. 
In any cost-benefit analysis of incapacitation policies, one would in any case expect 
to see in the ‘credit’ column:
•	  the money saved by the criminal justice system through incapacitation
•	  the full costs of crimes to victims, had the crimes occurred
On the debit side, one would expect to see the full cost of the additional 
imprisonment under consideration (including post release supervision and recalls), 
as well as the costs incurred by other government agencies in terms of additional 
welfare expenditure. In an ideal world economists might also try to ‘monetise’ 
the broader social costs of the damage that is done to communities’ capacity to 
regulate themselves when large proportions of their young male population are 
prisoners or ex-prisoners  – but that is probably unrealistic. However these social 
costs are real, even if they are not monetised.
When costing community sentences, it is equally important to cost criminal justice 
costs fully. Intensive supervision is expensive, but also tends to have higher than 
normal breach rates (because more is asked of those who serve these sentences), 
and a higher rate of imprisonment following breach. All these costs need to be 
accounted for.  
3  Costs per prisoner are marginally higher, in essence reflecting the financial ‘benefit’ of overcrowding.14
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When costs and benefits of custody and community sentences are compared, 
decisions have to be made about when to ‘start the clock running’ in calculating 
reconviction rates. Traditionally, this has been done at the point of sentence for 
community sentences and fines, and at the (real or estimated) point of release from 
custody for imprisonment. The reason for this is that the primary aim of reconviction 
studies, at least over the last two decades, has been to compare the deterrent/
rehabilitative effects of the two sentences. In our view, a full cost benefit comparison 
ought to take account of the effects both of incapacitation and of deterrence/
rehabilitation – but it would be best to estimate these separately, rather than in 
a single measure of reconviction that started at the point of sentence and thus 
underestimated deterrent and rehabilitative benefits of imprisonment. 
Todd Clear (2007) has demonstrated that imprisoning a large number of people for 
longer periods of time results in short-run declines in crime but long-run increases 
in crime when they are eventually released. Clear is able to show that high rates of 
incarceration (which are frequently concentrated in areas with higher than average 
levels of poverty), are associated with a range of negative consequences on those 
places subsequently. These outcomes include (but are presumably not limited 
to) increased rates of: sexually transmitted diseases, teenage births, and serious 
juvenile delinquency. Clear concludes that the growing reliance upon imprisonment 
as a policy solution creates a system ‘‘that feeds upon itself’’ exacerbating the very 
social problems that led to the increases in crime in the first place. In other words, 
we imprison people today, crime goes down tomorrow, but other social problems 
arise, only to cause increases in crime in the future. So cost-benefit analyses need 
to consider ‘spill-over effects’ into other policy arena and long-term effects as well.  
Finally, when cost-benefit analysis is done to examine the relative merits of prison 
and community sentences, it is important to remember that money can be directed 
to functions other than punishment. A useful reminder of this comes from an analysis 
by Bill Spelman of the impact of the massive expansion of imprisonment in Texas. His 
measured analysis concluded that the extra use of imprisonment had indeed had a 
marked impact on crime, but that the state’s investment in incarceration had reached 
a point of diminishing returns, making investment in job creation a better crime 
reduction option. The lesson is that even if jurisdictions with very deep pockets can 
reduce crime by building prisons, this may not be the best route to crime reduction.
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Community or Custodial Sentences: What’s the purpose?
The Spelman research neatly leads into our concluding section, in which we argue 
that penal policy – and more generally, criminal policy – needs a broader foundation 
than crime control alone. We hope we have shown that comparing the crime 
reduction benefits of prisons and community sentences is genuinely complex. There 
are quite clearly gains to be had in strategies of incapacitation, but these can easily 
be overestimated and under-costed. Partly, but not only, because of the difficulties 
in estimating the crime preventive returns from investment in different crime control 
strategies, we would argue that a wider range of criteria should inform justice policy.
A starting point in deriving these criteria is to ask the fundamental question of what 
criminal justice is for. As Tonry argues:
‘The overriding normative function of a sentencing system in a society 
committed to individual liberty, procedural fairness, and limited powers of 
government is to assure that individuals convicted of crimes receive the 
sentences that, in principle, they should.’
         (Tonry, 2006: 16)
At first sight, this statement seems a little vacuous or circular – the point of doing 
justice is to do justice – but, at least in liberal democracies, it is vital to surface this 
assumption, which is too easily taken-for-granted. If punishment involves the state 
in imposing harms on its citizens, then the process by which this is done must be 
carefully bounded and governed by law. 
Of course, what is ‘in’ and ‘out of bounds’ in sentencing depends to some extent 
on the normative principles that govern it. Without entering into the complex 
debates about these principles, perhaps a practical first step would be to ensure 
that any court sentence should observe a principle analogous to the Hippocratic 
one; that first and foremost, it should operate to minimise harms. We know that 
prison is a damaging experience, not only for prisoners, but for their families and the 
communities they live in – and to this extent high rates of imprisonment can damage 
the whole polity. This is, perhaps, the conundrum at the heart of retributivism. A ‘just 
measure of pain’ may be deserved. More controversially, it may even be necessary to 
express our revulsion, to denounce crime, to communicate censure. But if it merely 
harms, without also restoring, it leaves the whole polity weakened. 
The short and ‘common sense’ response to the fact that prison is a damaging 
experience is, of course, that ‘offenders’ should have thought of that before 
doing the crime, but brevity doesn’t mean accuracy. We suggest that much more 
attention is needed to the costs of punishment not just on people who have 
themselves offended, but on their families and on wider communities. The further 
that we remove people from the ways and means and reasons to live as we want 
them to live, the harder we make it for people to avoid reoffending. This is clearly 
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true for imprisonment – but community sentences also have unintended pains and 
create collateral damage; they may be less likely to damage the social ties and new 
identities that desistance from crime often requires, but it is not inevitable that they 
enhance them.
As this last point suggests, more ambitiously, we might also question exactly 
what are the positive goods that court sentences exist to produce? The safety of 
the community (which of course includes the perpetrators of crime) may be one 
such good, but might we also reasonably measure sentences by their capacity, 
for example, to support the development of constructive citizenship and to build 
community capacity and cohesion. Aspirational as these goals may seem, they 
lie at the heart of a more reparative or restorative vision of justice; one in which 
debts are settled not in pain but by positive contributions to the wellbeing of 
others. To elicit such contributions from people who may lack the skill (or the will) 
to do so might require a genuine commitment to rehabilitation and reintegration – 
without which the motivation, capacity and opportunity to contribute may not be 
engendered.
If it is accepted that it makes sense – both for principled and for pragmatic reasons 
- to be parsimonious in our approaches to punishment, to punish (if we must) in 
ways that support change, and to accept our duty (having punished) to play our 
various parts in supporting reintegration – in part giving people a chance to give 
something back - then we must judge sentences on these three criteria:
•	 on their parsimony 
•	 on their support for positive change 
•	 on their effects on reintegration.
The final criterion – about the effects on reintegration – needs to be emphasised. 
Reintegration is a wider concept than rehabilitation, and much broader than the 
prevention of reoffending. The competing alternatives need to be judged not simply 
according to their ability to deter or obstruct further offending, but also according 
to their ability to secure normative compliance with the law, and more broadly to 
represent, reflect and reinforce the legitimacy of criminal justice itself. Normative 
compliance involves something rather more subtle than “reprogramming”. It means 
buying into being law-abiding, not being compelled or cajoled or supervised into 
doing so. Though it may sound like a softer or more subjective aspect of being 
law-abiding, this is the kind of compliance on which the habits of being law-abiding 
may be most securely founded. When normative compliance is secured, external 
constraint is rarely required. And that, we suggest, in the long run provides the 
most cost-effective path to crime control – especially where it also involves the 
development of positive citizenship.
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This objective of securing normative compliance can be framed in a language that 
despite its religious overtones can still have relevance in a more secular age. We need 
to punish in a way that keeps alive the possibility of ‘redemption’, by emphasising 
redemptive narratives. One possible way forward is for those who have successfully 
completed intervention programmes (such as drug treatment) to return to the court 
which sentenced them in order for the magistrates to formally recognise the changes 
made and to congratulate them. This could become all the more powerful if those 
awaiting sentence saw these ‘de-labelling’ ceremonies in order to affirm on their 
minds the idea that change is possible. In short, punishment needs to have broader 
ambitions than simply to contain risk by warehousing those whose offending is 
serious and persistent. Undoubtedly these people strain the tolerance of all those 
who are affected by their offending. But to respond to them in a way that shuts off 
the possibility of a change of heart and a new start could actually make these things – 
which happen less often than we would like – even less likely to happen.
Intelligent Justice: Balancing the effects of community sentences and custody
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